Yes, but also it's an impressive digital Jedi mind trick on a website.

signs a question mark with hand

"This is the support number you're looking for."

And the victim is extra primed here because so many companies make it nearly impossible to talk to a human. Yikes!

Almost seems like there's room here for a grey hat to come in and use this trick to do a good faith job trying to help the customer through their problem. Then tell them at the end that a recent anti-trust suit requires them to tell the customer about alternate independent venues in their area where they can support live music.

Here's a real example from the same thing happening on FB (don't call that number) https://i.redd.it/w9htjqflgjle1.jpeg

Apparently Live Nation owns many performance venues and leverages their power in that market to gain an advantage in the ticket sales market. “Sell through us or you won’t be allowed to play at any famous venue in this city” kind of deal.

Don’t have any sources beyond “heard it on a podcast” though ¯\_(ツ)_/¯

Having personal issues with Ticketmaster's pricing methods (causing many to probably never want to do anything that might help) is a different issue than the website being used as a source for redirecting calls to fake call centers.

Since they escalated maybe something will get done. Ticketmaster would have a motivation, if large numbers fall prey to diverted call center scams it only makes their reputation flounder even worse.

(...obvious joke here would be if the scammers actually offer better support, they're just trying to steal call center business)

If only the Ticketmaster team could show ads on that domain, all these ads would have to go through their marketing team (and use ticketmaster's budget, with all the accounting and invoicing this requires), which would massively slow things down.

Instead, it seems that Google has some kind of protection where ads mentioning Ticketmaster must link to their official domain, to prevent things like this from happening. The scammers just found a way for that domain to display arbitrary text.

Well that's fine; my school did the same thing and other than feeling wasteful there was no-

> All normal ports were open - ssh, http(s), you name it. It was the OG zero trust architecture.

Oh. Yeah, open ports by default is... and interesting life choice.

At my old university even printers had public IP addresses.

After some people started publicly naming and shaming on LinkedIn and tagging ENISA, the issue got some exposure, but still was not fixed. It only made it more evident that several people independently reported these issues, and they became aware of peers stumbling over the issue. Still nothing happened.

ENISA is supposed to act as a CNA and expects to be notified of data breaches from EU based orgs for PSIRT / CSIRT as part of the Cybersec Resiliance Act and other laws.

Would I trust that vulnerability data that gets reported as a CVE, or a breach notification is safe with ENSIA ?

... feck no!

Would I trust that documents that europa.eu hosts on its infra are authentic? (such as security-compliance documents telling orgs how to properly implement security, but literally any public communication under one of the domains)

... hecking heck no!

... At this stage I think everyone else except ENISA has control over their infrastructure.

The misspellings and grammatical errors (used to?) continue on the fake sites that are created to steal credentials, and the excuses for most of the reasoning regarding emails do not hold there.

I don't know what the state of big corps netsec is today but these guys had it somewhat easy. They got initial access through weak wifi then pivoted with SQL injects and such.